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ABSTRACT
Location-Based Services (LBSes) are increasing in popular-
ity, but create many privacy concerns for users. LBSes usu-
ally rely on the same default privacy settings for all users. In
this position paper, we claim that such settings are inappro-
priate for location sharing and that settings should instead
rely on contextual information to recommend personalised
privacy settings for users. We present results of an initial
user study (n=80) to corroborate this position, and suggest
avenues for further research.
1. INTRODUCTION
Location-Based Services (LBSes) have become increas-
ingly popular and, coupled with recent growth in smartphone
usage, provide an interesting platform for the deployment
of recommendation and personalisation technologies. These
services, however, introduce many potential privacy prob-
lems: a recent survey reveals that 84% of users are con-
cerned about potential losses of privacy when using LBSes,
and 49% would be more comfortable if they could easily and
clearly manage who sees their location information.1 Man-
aging who can see one’s personal information is currently
done through static settings for most popular Social Network
Sites (SNSes) such as Facebook, Twitter or Google+; users
are asked to adjust their settings and these are typically ap-
plied to all interactions with a given member or set of mem-
bers on the site. Such static settings might be appropriate for
sharing static information: a user’s birthday does not change
very often, and so the set of users with whom a user might
wish to share their birthday might also not change. But this
might not be true when sharing varying information such as
location, as privacy preferences may depend on the particu-
lar context in which a location is visited, and not only on the
person with whom it would be shared.
Nonetheless, LBS settings are usually static, not only for
Facebook or Google+’s location-sharing features, but also
for SNSes dedicated to location sharing such as Gowalla or
Foursquare. This may be due to the disruption that would be
1Microsoft Research Data Privacy Day 2011, http://www.
microsoft.com/privacy/dpd/
caused by asking a user about their sharing choices for every
location. Alternatives to such a disruptive solution would
be to automatically predict a user’s sharing choices, or to
recommend privacy settings to the user.
In this position paper, we propose that before we attempt
to provide personalisation and recommendation technolo-
gies to mobile users, we should first develop personalised
privacy settings that can better cope with users’ actual shar-
ing preferences than static settings. Using data collected
from a mobile location-sharing study with 80 participants,
we investigate whether the personalisation of settings can
leverage contextual and self-reported information.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the
next section, we demonstrate how static settings are not ap-
propriate. Section 3 defines what context could be exploited
by LBS settings and how it could help predicting users’ lo-
cation sharing choices. We then review related work in Sec-
tion 4 and discuss our position in Section 5.
2. STATIC PRIVACY SETTINGS
Static settings for LBSes would be appropriate if users
actually had static privacy preferences while sharing their
locations with other people. To determine just how constant
users’ behaviours are, we conducted an experiment with 80
student participants, each carrying a mobile phone for seven
days and sharing their locations with their social network.
Our methodology [2] is divided into three consecutive phases:
• Pre-briefing. Participants install a Facebook applica-
tion on their personal Facebook account and fill in a
questionnaire.
• LBS usage. Over the course of seven days, partici-
pants use LocShare, a custom mobile application al-
lowing them to share their location with their social
network on Facebook. Using the Experience Sampling
Method, they also reply to automatically generated ques-
tions about their experience and sharing choices, sent
to them on the mobile phone.
• Debriefing. Participants were interviewed and asked
for more explanation about their sharing choices.
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Participants were periodically asked to share their current
location, or a picture of their current location. Upon receiv-
ing a sharing request, a participant had the choice of reply-
ing or ignoring the request.2 In addition to these prompted
events, LocShare allowed participants to share their location
(described with text comments or a photo) of their own ac-
cord without being prompted.
In total, 4,334 sharing requests were sent to participants,
which led to 2,064 replies (a 47.6% response rate). Partici-
pants also shared 531 locations without prompting. We refer
to any of these 2,595 events as a sharing event. At each
sharing event, participants had the choice of sharing their
location with: everyone on Facebook, only their Facebook
friends, only a subset of their Facebook friends, or no-one.
In the latter case, the location was still uploaded on Face-
book but remained only visible to the participant.3 We fur-
ther refer to any of these choices as a sharing choice.
Looking at each of the 80 participants, we see that none of
them made the same sharing choice at each of their sharing
events. In other words, not a single participant would have
been satisfied with static privacy settings for their location-
sharing application. To verify this assumption, we asked
participants in the pre-briefing to choose a default sharing
choice for the experiment, that would be used when the sys-
tem decided to share their location without prompting. Fig-
ure 1 shows the Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function
of the sharing choices made by the participants. 23 partic-
ipants (28.8%) never used their default sharing choice for
their sharing events. The participant who most used the
default sharing choice used it for 97.6% of their sharing
events. Hence, all of the participants made at least one shar-
ing choice that differed from their static default sharing choice.
From Figure 1 we also see that the median participant used
their default settings for just 9.5% of sharing events.
In the pre-briefing, participants were asked whether they
had changed their Facebook privacy settings from their de-
fault values. Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that those par-
ticipants who use the default Facebook privacy settings (23
participants) were more likely to use their default settings
during the experiment: the median participant in this group
used their default settings for 33.3% of their sharing events.
On the other hand, the median participant from the group
that used personalised Facebook privacy settings used their
default settings for only 7% of their sharing events.
Not only are static privacy settings inappropriate, they
may lead to unintended information disclosure. Of the 1,889
sharing events where participants did not use their default
sharing settings, 455 of the events (24.1%) used settings less
2Ignoring a request was not always deliberate. Participants may
have not heard the mobile phone ringing, or were temporarily not
covered by the cellular network. The sharing request would then
timeout and no longer be displayed on the phone.
3To test a different hypothesis [8], half the participants were allo-
cated to a simulated sharing group, where locations were not ac-
tually shared, but participants were asked to act as if they were.
Results from the two groups are merged in this paper.
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Figure 1: Empirical CDF of the proportion of sharing
events where a participant shared their location using
their default settings. No participant made the same
sharing choice at every sharing event.
permissive than the defaults. In other words, if participants
were unable to personalise their default privacy settings, us-
ing their static default privacy settings would have incurred
455 privacy leaks, by sharing their location to people with
whom they were not willing to share. We therefore believe
that LBSes should provide personalisable privacy settings
that reflect users’ personal needs.
3. TOWARDS CONTEXT-BASED SETTINGS
We have seen that location privacy settings are not static
in practice. We believe that this is because they depend on a
user’s current context, e.g., where the user is, who they are
with, what is nearby, and so forth [9]. Indeed, personalised
LBSes are a good example of the context-aware application
as defined by Schilit et al. [9], as they may involve Automatic
Contextual Reconfiguration, as the LBS is reconfigured ac-
cording to the context, and Context-Triggered Actions, as the
context might trigger an action from the LBS (e.g., recom-
mending new privacy settings for users).
We can imagine a multitude of simple examples where
context might influence Alice’s decision to share her loca-
tion. In a first scenario, Alice does not mind sharing her
location to her friends and family wherever she goes, but
some evenings, she is tired and does not want them to pop-
up when she is at home. She would then hide her location
for the evening. In another scenario, Alice does not want her
family to know that she is with Bob at night. Since she has
no control over Bob’s sharing choices, she wants to hide her
location to her family in the evening when she is with Bob,
as otherwise Alice and Bob would both share the same loca-
tion and therefore disclose that they are seeing each other.
While Alice’s desired privacy settings are not static, ask-
ing for her location-sharing preferences at every new loca-
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Figure 2: Private and public rates for different types of
locations. Participants were less likely to share their lo-
cation in Library and Residential areas.
tion would be highly disruptive. An alternative solution is
then for the LBS to infer Alice’s privacy settings according
to the current context. To do so, the system needs to sense
context, and then determine which contextual information
might influence Alice’s sharing choices.
Recent research has shown that automatically sensing con-
text is possible, for instance by sensing activity using the
accelerometer and microphone [6], location using GPS/Wi-
Fi/GSM but also compasses and accelerometers [3], and co-
located people using Bluetooth [7]. Hence we believe that
context can be used by LBSes. But using this sensed con-
text to determine what information influences users’ sharing
choices introduces new challenges. The particular informa-
tion may vary for each user and may be based on complex
social considerations.
So if context can be used to recommend and personalise
privacy settings, what contextual information should be used?
We now investigate the contextual and self-reported infor-
mation that influence our participants’ location sharing choices.
We study two extreme behaviours: sharing with nobody, and
sharing with everyone on Facebook. We define the private
rate as the proportion of events where locations were shared
to no-one, and the public rate as the proportion of events
where locations were shared to everyone.
Location itself is the first obvious piece of contextual in-
formation that may influence user behaviour. Figure 2 shows
that both private and public rates depend on the type of lo-
cation. Participants have higher private rates in the Library
and Residential areas, and thus share their location less than
in other types of places. On the other hand, public rates are
higher in Leisure, Academic and Retail places. During the
debriefing interviews, some of the reasons provided for not
sharing were that participants did not want people to join
when they were at the Library, and did not want them to
know that they were staying home on a Saturday night.
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Figure 3: Private and public rates when the participants
are alone, with friends, and with strangers. Participants
were less likely to share their location when alone.
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Figure 4: Private and public rates during day time (be-
tween 0800 and 2000) and night time. There was little
difference in sharing behaviour over time.
The presence of other co-located people is another ex-
ample of contextual information that can influence location
sharing. At each sharing event, participants were asked if
they were with no-one, with friends, or with strangers. Fig-
ure 3 shows that the private rate is higher when the partici-
pants are alone than when they are with strangers.
That said, not every aspect of the context appears to influ-
ence sharing choices. For example, Figure 4 shows no clear
difference between day time (0800-2000) and night time.
Nonetheless, we believe that these initial results indicate
that gathering more empirical data about users’ choices and
corresponding contexts can provide a better insight on what
contextual information could be used to recommend person-
alised privacy settings to LBS users.
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4. RELATED WORK
Context is key in the development of new services that
will impact social inclusion for the emerging information so-
ciety [4]. It has already been used for various purposes, such
as predicting users’ interests for websites [11]. Anthony et
al. [1] show experimentally that privacy preferences vary
with place and social context. Fang et al. [5] exploits this
observation by proposing a privacy recommendation wizard
for Facebook settings. By asking limited questions to users
about what they would disclose to some of their friends, they
generate personalised privacy settings. Toch et al. [10] use
the same concept for Locaccino, an LBS that allows the
users to set their default privacy settings by defining who,
where, and when they want their location to be disclosed.
5. WHAT NEXT?
The rise of location-based services will enable the appli-
cation of personalisation and recommendation technologies
in people’s everyday lives. But if people are to use these
services, their requirements need to be respected. Static de-
fault privacy settings provided by current location-based ser-
vices are inappropriate as they do not meet these require-
ments, where the privacy settings for a particular event may
be determined by the context in which the event takes place.
We have outlined these user requirements by collecting data
through a user study, and conducted some initial analysis to
show how we might build LBS systems that can recommend
personalised privacy settings.
Building a usable LBS with personalised privacy settings
presents many interesting challenges. One approach is to
bootstrap the system by asking the users for their privacy
settings when a new context is detected, and then use these
same settings when the same context is later encountered.
This solution is highly disruptive at the beginning, but should
eventually become less disruptive when no new contexts are
encountered. A second approach is to use data collected
from other users with a similar profile who have experienced
similar contexts. This requires collecting a large amount
of empirical data, however, and either determining how to
match similar profiles and contexts, or how to choose one de-
fault per context. Self-reported data are also a useful source
of information about the users’ behaviour. For instance, we
observed that the participants who reported using Facebook
default privacy settings were using default settings more of-
ten in our experiment than participants who reported using
custom privacy settings on Facebook.
Using a combination of all these approaches, a system
could start applying a user’s chosen default setting, and then
use machine learning techniques to recommend personalised
settings, based on the context sensed by the mobile device,
on behavioural data collected from other users, and on self-
reported information about the user.
Thus, in this paper we argue that before we can apply per-
sonalisation to the services themselves, we should apply per-
sonalisation to the privacy settings for these services. Such
personalised settings are not only necessary for meeting user
requirements, but they should also be considered as a prereq-
uisite for offering personalised services to LBS users: per-
sonalised services should not exploit locations that users do
not want to share.
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